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Despite a widespread acceptance that the brain that underpins human psychology is the
result of biological evolution, very few psychologists in any way incorporate an evolutionary
perspective in their research or practice. There have been many attempts to convince
mainstream psychology of the importance of such a perspective, mostly from those who
identify with “Evolutionary Psychology,” and there has certainly been progress in that
direction, but the core of psychology remains essentially unevolutionary. Here I explore a
number of potential reasons for mainstream psychology continuing to ignore or resist an
evolutionary approach, and suggest some ways in which those of us interested in seeing
an increase in the proportion of psychologists adopting an evolutionary perspective might
need to modify our tactics to increase our chances of success.
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If we assume that very few highly educated people don’t believe
in biological evolution (which is a fairly safe assumption), then
it follows that the vast majority of scientifically oriented psy-
chologists, and psychology researchers believe that the neu-
ral mechanisms that underpin our psychological abilities and
propensities are the product of evolution—of natural, kin, and
sexual selection. It is puzzling, therefore, that there is not a
more widespread acceptance of the importance of an evolution-
arily informed approach in our science. Despite an increasing
awareness and acceptance of Evolutionary Psychology (EP), it is
not an exaggeration to say that almost all of the research that
happens in psychology (excluding those areas explicitly inter-
ested in evolution, like EP and comparative psychology), and
almost all of the applications of psychology, completely ignore
the evolutionary origin of the mechanisms being studied, or the
“principles” being applied. This is despite a series of spirited,
and well-informed calls-to-arms and clarifications, each making
the case that an evolutionary approach is fundamentally impor-
tant, and cogently dispelling a series of prevailing myths about
what such an approach entails (e.g., Barkow et al., 1992; Buss
et al., 1998; Buss, 2005; Confer et al., 2010; Cosmides and Tooby,
2013). Rather than simply adding my voice to those explaining
the nature and virtues of an evolutionary approach to psychol-
ogy, my aim in the current essay is to suggest some ideas about
why the case that has been put may not be having the traction
those of us in the field had hoped it would. The perspective I
am providing is that of a researcher who is involved in both EP,
as it is applied to understanding human psychological mecha-
nisms, and the ecological approach to comparative cognition,
which attempts to understand how selective forces shape cognitive
mechanisms in non-humans, as well as that of an academic who
has taught psychology (and some biology) during the 20 years
that both these research enterprises have grown in influence and
popularity. My hope is to be able to highlight some potential bar-
riers to a widespread acceptance of the centrality of evolution in
psychology, and to suggest some ways in which we may be able to
move forward.
While the list below is likely to be an underestimate of the fac-
tors involved, and reflects personal observations, to some extent
(and so may be less true of psychology sub-disciplines I am
less familiar with), I believe that there are at least six fairly
straightforward explanations for continued resistance to adopting
a thoroughgoing evolutionary approach in mainstream psychol-
ogy, each of which will be explored in more detail. The factors
are not completely independent, and no doubt interact with each
other, which will complicate the picture, but hopefully by mak-
ing them explicit, we will be able to better understand both the
nature of the forces that need to be overcome and the weakness of
the position that they represent.
(1) The primacy of mechanism.
(2) The identification of EP with particular versions of it.
(3) Just so story telling.
(4) Motivated opposition.
(5) Theoretical inertia and misguided skepticism.
(6) Poor understanding of modern evolutionary principles in
psychology.
THE PRIMACY OF MECHANISM
For many psychology researchers the fact that a mechanism is the
result of past evolutionary forces is assumed to be true (at least
in principle), but it is also assumed to be essentially irrelevant for
understanding how the mechanism works, which is the main aim
ofmost psychological research. This perspective is frequently (and
fairly) criticized for providing an incomplete understanding of
the mechanism in question, since it ignores it’s evolved function,
but I think there is a danger that ignoring evolutionary considera-
tions is actually much more insidiously damaging than this, since
it can lead to the postulation of psychological mechanisms that
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are, a priori, very unlikely to be true, and since, divorced from
its function, we run the risk of misunderstanding even how the
mechanism works.
The potential dangers of ignoring evolutionary considerations
can be illustrated by the following series of studies examining
performance on spatial memory tasks by nectar-feeding birds.
Burke and Fulham (2003) showed that Regent Honeyeaters, an
Australian nectar-feeding bird were much better able to learn to
avoid a feeder that they had recently found nectar in (to win-
shift) than they were able to learn to return to that location
(win-stay). This is the same pattern found in other nectar feed-
ing species (e.g., Kamil, 1978), and reflects the fact that, in the
wild, a visited flower is depleted of nectar, and so avoiding such
locations leads to efficient foraging. We could have postulated
some memory/motivational mechanism that accounted for this
behavior (indeed there were some general process ones already
available in the psychology literature—Gaffan and Davies, 1981,
1982), but ecological considerations led us to test whether after
a long delay (long enough for flowers in the wild to have replen-
ished their nectar) this tendency might be reversed. This is what
we found—at long delays, the birds actually more easily learnt to
win-stay than to win-shift, despite all the birds in our study being
captive born and reared, and so being unfamiliar with the natu-
ral replenishment rates of flowers. This finding demonstrates that
the way the spatial memory mechanism underpinning returning
to or avoiding rewarding locations works is intimately tied to it’s
adaptive function. We have subsequently followed this research
up, probing the mechanism in more detail in a related omnivo-
rous species (Noisy Miners), and determined that the win shift
bias is expressed only when the reward is nectar, not when it is
an invertebrate (as predicted from the spatio-temporal distribu-
tion of these two foods—Sulikowski and Burke, 2007), despite
the tasks being identical in every way except for the nature of the
reward. This effect is partly driven by the birds searching through
arrays in different ways for nectar and invertebrates (Sulikowski
and Burke, 2010a), partly by the fact that birds do not encode the
spatial locations of invertebrate loaded feeders (Sulikowski and
Burke, 2010b), instead moving systematically through the array,
whereas they spontaneously encode the locations of nectar loaded
feeders (Sulikowski and Burke, 2011). Careful analysis of foraging
patterns also suggests that poor performance in win-stay condi-
tions with a nectar reward is not a consequence of poor memory
for rewarded locations, but probably reflects a selective inhibition
of the win-stay behavior (Sulikowski and Burke, 2012).
None of these aspects of the way this particular mechanism (or
mechanisms) works would even have been investigated without
thinking about remembering spatial locations from an ecologi-
cal perspective. The details are tightly tied to the foraging ecology
of the birds in question, and operate differently depending on
the reward being searched for. A straightforward, but not widely
appreciated, implication of this is that it may well be meaning-
less to talk about a general spatial memory mechanism, in any
species (including humans)—that psychological mechanisms can
only be understood in their evolutionary/functional context. In
the current example, what is remembered about rewarding spa-
tial locations depends on the kind of food found there and the
length of the “retention interval”—neither of these effects can
be predicted by any general theory of memory (or even spatial
or “working” memory), but both are predicted by the spatio-
temporal distribution of the bird’s food in the wild. There have
been pushes to better incorporate mechanism in behavioral ecol-
ogy (McNamara and Houston, 2009), and evolution and ecology
in investigations of psychological mechanism (e.g., Kamil, 1988;
Barkow et al., 1992; Buss et al., 1998; Shettleworth, 2010, etc.),
but perhaps to ensure greater impact we should be emphasizing
the fact that the two will frequently be intrinsically intertwined,
and that one without the other won’t just produce incomplete
understanding, it may well produce completemisunderstandings.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
WITH PARTICULAR VERSIONS OF IT
Much of the explicit criticism of EP is clearly directed at just
the most visible, and formally articulated versions of it, rather
than being criticisms of an evolutionary approach to psychology
in general. Indeed, some critics are explicit about this distinction
(Buller, 2005), as discussed later. This is unfortunate because for
those that don’t closely follow the details of these debates, a crit-
icism of particular versions of EP is taken as a criticism of the
approach, and used as a justification for continuing to ignore
evolution in psychology, and at least some of the things the crit-
ics have targeted are not arguments against the importance of an
evolutionary approach.
While we have very good reasons to be grateful for the pio-
neering efforts of those that forged the field, it is probably time to
explicitly acknowledge that not everyone taking an evolutionary
approach to understanding psychology accepts all of the features
that have been taken to be diagnostic of EP. The two main stick-
ing points from outside the field seem to be the notion of massive
modularity and that adaptations are “designed” to operate in the
Pleistocene, but I argue below that there is also no necessary link
between adopting an evolutionary approach and believing that
the brain is a computational information processing device (even
though all the major summaries of the perspective claim this as
a central tenet of EP). Indeed, two papers in the current issue are
arguing for an evolutionary approach to understanding psychol-
ogy, but equate EP with a computational and modular approach
(Barrett et al., 2014; Stotz, 2014).
Well-balanced and convincing arguments have been mounted
from within the field defending the idea of modules for process-
ing (to some extent) domain-specific information (e.g., Barrett
and Kurzban, 2006), but much of the force of these arguments
depends on the underlying assumption that the brain is an infor-
mation processing device. In the absence of that assumption
(discussed below), we can probably safely not commit ourselves
to exactly how modular evolved mechanisms are likely to be,
without in any way compromising our insistence that we need
to understand the mechanism from an evolutionary perspec-
tive. The convoluted and interconnected way in which complex
adaptations evolve means that we should probably expect some
to be quite modular, and others to depend on components of
pre-existing mechanisms, or even to co-evolve with other mech-
anisms. The immune system, for example can be thought of as
a module (at least in terms of having a specific job, or set of
related jobs, to do), but it “uses” the circulatory system to “get to”
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sites of infection. It is difficult to decide, therefore, whether the
circulatory system should be counted as part of the immune sys-
tem, and/or whether combating pathogens should be considered
one of the jobs (part of the “input”) of the circulatory system. As
this example hopefully illustrates, there is a real sense in which
these decisions need not be made, since they don’t help us to
understand how any of the mechanisms in question work, or how
they evolved. In the same way, I think that while it is critical to
identify the function, and in some cases functions, a psycholog-
ical mechanism performs, we need not worry about whether we
would classify it as a module or not, and there is certainly no need
to insist that solving specific (even mutually incompatible) adap-
tive problems will necessarily result in a massively modular brain.
Indeed, incompatible functions will frequently lead to adaptive
tradeoffs in the underlying mechanisms rather than to a diver-
gence of underlyingmechanisms. Elaborate sexual ornaments, for
example (like peacock tails) are advantageous in terms of attract-
ing mates, but are frequently constrained by natural selection,
since they are energetic and survival impediments.
Similarly, although there is no formally articulated alterna-
tive, since all of the major summaries of the field subscribe to
the information processing/computational metaphor (in com-
mon with the vast majority of cognitive psychologists), there is
actually no logical link between such a metaphor of brain (or
“mind”) function and an evolutionary approach. This metaphor
is largely absent in behavioral ecology and ethology (includ-
ing human ethology), for example, but those fields have made
enormous contributions to our understanding of the evolution
of behavior and behavioral mechanisms. In fact, it seems to
me that thinking about brains from an evolutionary perspec-
tive actually undermines the information processing metaphor.
Brains cannot be “for” processing information, because process-
ing information has no fitness consequences. Gaining sensitivity
to important environmental information can have fitness conse-
quences, provided that information is appropriately acted upon,
and brains are clearly involved in providing organisms with
sensitivity to environmental information and in coordinating
actions. My view is that the direct approach to cognition, like that
espoused by Gibson (1979), which emphasizes dynamic, embed-
ded organism-environment interactions, is a much more natural
fit for an evolutionary approach, but like modularity, I think
that meta-theoretical perspectives about the nature of cognition
are not central to an evolutionary approach to Psychology, and
so it is not appropriate or necessary to commit the field to any
particular approach. This might have the additional benefit of
attracting more biologists to study the evolution of psychologi-
cal mechanisms. The impression I get from colleagues in biology
is that many avoid psychological questions because they see things
like the computational/representational approach as esoteric and
unnecessary abstractions.
Consistent with the idea that we need not commit to either
massive modularity or the information processing metaphor
as characteristics of EP is the fact that fewer than 1% of
papers published in the journals Evolutionary Psychology and
Evolution and Human Behavior in 2013 (total 104—excluding
the special issue of EP) in any way address, or are even
informed by, these issues. Much more common (17%) is deriving
hypotheses (or drawing conclusions) based on thinking about
adaptive problems faced by our Pleistocene (or at least Hunter-
Gatherer) ancestors, which is addressed in the next section.
The vast majority of research in both journals (the other
80%) tests hypotheses derived from fundamental evolutionary
principles.
JUST SO STORY TELLING
Despite numerous attempts to explain exactly how evolutionary
hypotheses are derived and tested (and occasionally rejected) in
exactly the same way that other kinds of hypotheses in psychol-
ogy are derived and tested, most recently by Confer et al. (2010),
the idea that evolutionary hypotheses are somehow intrinsically
untestable remains a pervasive view (Kurzban, 2010). Perhaps we
might make more headway by more frequently acknowledging
that evolutionary hypotheses are actually quite difficult to test
(as have Confer et al., 2010, for example), and that psychological
studies are but one of many lines of converging evidence that are
helping to put together the pieces of the puzzle. It is probably a fair
criticism of our field that we rely too heavily on uncovering signs
of special design of human psychological mechanisms as evidence
of their evolution, and too little on examining the mechanism
across species (Vonk and Shackelford, 2013). Other fields that are
interested in the evolution of behavioral mechanisms routinely
make phylogenetic comparisons, to test hypotheses. Even where
we are proposing the evolution of a uniquely human adapta-
tion, cross-species comparisons are (ultimately) necessary to test
that idea. Of course not every paper needs to include such com-
parisons (particularly since they are often logistically difficult),
but we may gain more widespread acceptance (or at least less
widespread resistance) by explicitly acknowledging that without
such comparisons many conclusions need to remain tentative.
I am not here arguing that we need cross species compar-
isons to test whether a mechanism evolved—I think we need to be
working toward a broad psychology in which that is an unques-
tioned assumption—but to test how it evolved—using knowledge
of phylogeny and ecological selective forces. To illustrate this, con-
sider Burke and Sulikowski’s (2010) demonstration that backward
tilted faces (simulating viewing from below) are judged as more
masculine (or less feminine) and forward tilted faces (simulat-
ing viewing from above) are judged to be more feminine (or less
masculine). Based on this, they concluded that the structural sex-
ual dimorphism in human faces, with males having larger jaws
and smaller eyes, and females having smaller jaws and larger eyes,
may have evolved to accentuate, or just make structural, the dif-
ferent appearance of faces viewed from above (as females tend to
be seen bymales) and below (as males tend to be seen by females),
since males and females also differ in average height. The data are
consistent with this conclusion, but it is strengthened by the fact
that all of the hominins (who are all bipedal) show marked sexual
height dimorphism, and the same face dimorphism as humans,
but that the other apes (who are not bipedal) do not show the
same face shape dimorphism. Of course this alone is not sufficient
to conclude that the face shape differences are a consequence of an
evolved signal exploiting the height-based perspective difference,
but it is corroborating. Further evidence is required to rule out
other possibilities, but the point of this example is to highlight
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that necessary and sufficient evidence won’t always come from
Psychology, or from humans.
The impression I get from my colleagues is that part of the
indelibility of the stain of “just-so story telling” is related to the
idea that EP is fundamentally focused on explaining (all) human
behavior in terms of what would have been useful to our Hunter-
Gatherer ancestors. Although it is true that we have spent the vast
majority of our time as a species living such a lifestyle, it is almost
certainly not true that most of our cognitive adaptations are for
a “stone age” world—almost all of them very likely to predate
this epoch considerably, and some may be newer. For example,
almost every adaptation for perceiving the world (accounting for
something like half of the neurons in the brain), was in place
long before this epoch, and the mechanisms underpinning lac-
tose tolerance, and resistance to particular localized diseases (e.g.,
malaria, plague) appear to have arisen later (Schaffner and Sabeti,
2008). Given that most EP is not actually about testing hypotheses
specific to this epoch, since most studies tests hypotheses derived
from fundamental evolutionary principles, one way of overcom-
ing this misconception might be to try to more widely publicize
those kinds of studies.
MOTIVATED OPPOSITION
Despite a noticeable (if gradual) shift away from what Tooby
and Cosmides (1992) originally identified as the Standard Social
Science Model, there remain pockets of vigorous opposition to
the evolutionary approach to psychology. The main problem
with this opposition is not the logic of the arguments or the
strength of the evidence they provide against EP—typically they
are weak, or based on a misunderstanding (Kurzban, 2010)—it
is the fact that any kind of formal opposition provides a ratio-
nale for mainstream psychologists to keep ignoring evolutionary
approaches.
There are clear signs that this opposition is motivated, rather
than an inevitable consequence of a careful analysis of the accu-
mulated evidence. Naturally, claims for which there is insufficient
evidence are a concern in any field, and it is appropriate therefore
to invite as much scrutiny as possible, but EP is the kind of field
that has long had to deal with criticism (unfortunately much of it
based on the next two factors discussed), and so is probably less
likely than most fields to make claims for which there is insuffi-
cient evidence. One sign that some critiques are motivated is that
they draw substantially broader conclusions than are warranted
by their data and/or analyses. For example, Buller (2000, 2005)
claims to have no issue with EP as a field of enquiry (generally tak-
ing an evolutionary approach to psychological questions) but is
rather scathing of EP as a paradigm (by which he seems to mean
the research done by the most prominent practitioners). Despite
having no (avowed) problems with EP as a field of enquiry, he
makes the very broad claim that there is no good evidence for any
of the psychological adaptations that have been proposed. It is
not unreasonable to suppose that critiques that find flaws with
all of the claims that have been made might not be weighing up
evidence in a completely unbiased way.
To further illustrate the nature of the problem, I will focus
on a more recent critic of EP research, Christine Harris, who
has published two failures to replicate evolutionarily inspired
studies reporting shifts in women’s judgments across the men-
strual cycle. The first called into question the well-known (and
indeed well-established) fluctuations in attractiveness judgments
(Harris, 2011) and the most recent “failed to replicate” a shift in
voting preferences (Harris and Mickes, 2014). Clear and cogent
responses to both of these have been published, by the origi-
nal researchers (DeBruine et al., 2010; Gildersleeve et al., 2013;
Durante et al., 2014), identifying flaws in logic and methodology,
but it is the broader conclusions Harris tries to draw that I believe
reveal an obvious bias. Having failed to replicate one particu-
lar study of shifts in women’s preferences for masculinized faces
across the menstrual cycle (and having failed to review the large
body of corroborating evidence), Harris (2011) concludes that we
should be questioning “much of the current work in evolutionary
psychology,” especially those that identify “gender differences.”
This, of course, is not in any way warranted by the data, sug-
gesting an obvious agenda. Similarly, despite a provocative (and
politically charged) title—“Women can keep the vote: No evi-
dence that hormonal changes during the menstrual cycle impact
political and religious beliefs”—Harris and Mickes (2014) actu-
ally did replicate the interaction between menstrual cycle phase
and relationship status on voting intentions—the most interest-
ing aspect of the original study that they claim to have failed to
replicate. Rather than attempting to get to the bottom of such an
intriguing effect, their final conclusion is that their data add to a
“growing number of failures to replicate several menstrual cycle
effects on preferences” (they cite two), and essentially insinuate
that the previous (very numerous) reports of positive effects of
menstrual cycle phase on preferences are a consequence of “flex-
ible” data analysis and fertility status classifications (for which
there is no evidence).
It is difficult to be sure, but the tone of Harris’ opposition to
the evidence of menstrual cycle shifts in judgments suggests that
it is based on the idea that such conclusions are somehow sexist—
that they suggest that women’s decisions are in some sense “at the
mercy of their hormones.” But I take the main message of this
research to be that we are all, in some sense at least, at the mercy
of our hormones (and not just gonadal ones), as they influence
our decisions in evolutionarily adaptive ways. The preponder-
ance of studies examining fluctuations across the menstrual cycle
is almost certainly a simple consequence of the natural pseudo-
experiment afforded by monthly variations in hormone balances.
To look for the same effects in men, hormone levels need to be
actually measured or manipulated, which makes such studies less
common, but there is good evidence of strong effects of hormones
on male behavior too (e.g., Mazur and Booth, 1998).
Of more concern than the opposition of any individual
researcher (or group) is what quite obvious biases in published
papers suggest about the broad attitudes of the field. It is worth
wondering, for example, whether the “failed” replication of the
Durante et al. (2013) paper would have ever been published in the
absence of a broad (if potentially subtle) bias against evolution-
ary explanations (and/or those proposing sex differences based
on something other than socialization differences) in mainstream
psychology. Not only did the paper actually not fail to replicate the
primary finding, it misrepresented the original authors’ rationale
(in a way that is consistent with well-known misunderstandings
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about evolutionary approaches being inherently sexist), was pub-
lished despite at least one of the reviewers having sufficiently
serious misgivings that they re-analyzed the data and found even
more consistencies between the two studies, and was allowed to go
to print with a title that clearly suggested that the original research
was sexist, and with a conclusion that smears the entire body of
literature examining shifts in preferences across the menstrual
cycle. These are excesses that are typically not permitted. That
they were permitted in a high-impact, mainstream psychology
journal suggests the influence of a pervasive bias.
THEORETICAL INERTIA AND MISGUIDED SKEPTICISM
In general, in Science, skepticism is an invaluable tool, since it
minimizes the risk of drawing conclusions on too little data, and
especially of discarding existing theories without sufficient jus-
tification. But skepticism is frequently asymmetrical, with new
approaches beingmore intensely scrutinized than old approaches.
This is justified if the old approach is built on solid foundations,
and has hadmuch explanatory success, but there are good reasons
for questioning whether this is true of many theories in psychol-
ogy, especially since evolution was not one of the basic principles
upon which they were built. I think that this asymmetrical skep-
ticism might be at the heart of at least some of the bias against
evolutionary approaches in mainstream psychology, even in the
absence of any obviously motivated opposition.
The impression I have of the attitude of many of my colleagues
is that there is no real need to adopt an evolutionary approach
because psychology is doing fine without one, and this is asso-
ciated with a reluctance to accept even demonstrations of the
importance of an evolutionary perspective, with skeptics argu-
ing that existing mechanisms (typically general process ones) are
capable of explaining the results, and so there is just no need to
propose “new” mechanisms. No doubt everyone who adopts an
evolutionary approach in psychology has had to argue against
these kinds of perspectives in their own sub-field, but in order to
draw attention to the pervasiveness of the problem, I’d like to use
an example of a general process mechanism that is accepted even
by many evolutionarily oriented researchers (e.g., Shettleworth,
2010; Cosmides and Tooby, 2013)—the idea that there are general
associative learning mechanisms.
The widespread acceptance of this view is an example of skep-
ticism being directed only at new evidence, not at the evidence
that underpins the traditional perspective. In fact, I think it is
perfectly reasonable to claim not only that there is no good evi-
dence that associative learning mechanisms are phylogenetically
widespread (let alone evolutionarily conserved), but to question
the very idea that any associative learning mechanisms have been
established, at all. I understand that this claim seems extreme, but
it is important to keep in mind that when we refer to classical
(or Pavlovian) conditioning or to instrumental (or operant) con-
ditioning, we are referring to learning situations—experimental
paradigms that have been extensively used to study learning.
What is actually learnt in these paradigms is very much a mat-
ter of ongoing debate (e.g., Gallistel, 1995; Gallistel and Gibbon,
2000), and it clearly depends on what is being learnt about, and
which species is doing the learning (as famously demonstrated by
Garcia and Koelling, 1966; Shettleworth, 1973; Timberlake, 2001).
It is true that using a neutral stimulus to predict the arrival of a
biologically (or at least behaviorally) significant stimulus (as in
a Pavlovian conditioning experiment) leads to the production of
anticipatory/preparatory behaviors in response to the previously
neutral stimulus in a wide range of species, but this is no more
evidence of a commonmechanism in those species than the obser-
vation that a wide range of species can move from point A to
point B is evidence of a common locomotion mechanism. The
trouble here is that psychologists, as they rather too frequently
do, have conflated a mechanism (how something works) with a
functional category of behavior (what something does). There is
actually no good evidence of universality of mechanism—indeed,
an argument could be mounted that there is not a single species
in which we understand how behavior is adjusted to exploit these
simple environmental contingencies, short of the not especially
helpful suggestion that the environmental association between
the stimuli has somehow been “copied” inside the organism.
I have chosen this likely controversial example to try to illus-
trate that even ideas that seem so well established that they are
essentially beyond question in psychology owe at least some of
their power and influence to a long history of investigation, but
that those factors are unrelated to the likelihood of the ideas
being true. Given that almost all of the longest-established ideas in
Psychology pre-date an evolutionary approach, we should expect
a reluctance to accept the need to factor evolution in. Maybe the
only way to overcome this resistance is to start using an evolu-
tionary approach to dismantle some of those ideas, not by just
suggesting that the standard social science model is an inappro-
priate one, given what we know about how mechanisms actually
evolve, but by actively targeting particular (maybe especially pop-
ular) theories that cannot be easily accommodated within an
evolutionary framework.
POOR UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN EVOLUTIONARY
PRINCIPLES
I think the most fundamental problem in the more widespread
acceptance of an evolutionary approach in psychology is the
fact that very few psychology researchers or practitioners actu-
ally understand evolution, a problem that is considerably com-
pounded by the fact that they are typically completely unaware
of this. This is likely to be a consequence of the fact that most
psychology degrees do not contain a good grounding in evolu-
tionary theory. I teach at a well-rated university in a Psychology
School that was one of only a handful in the country (Australia)
to receive a 5 star ranking in the latest national quality assessment
exercise, and I recently asked an advanced undergraduate class (in
their 4th year) if they could describe the difference between nat-
ural and sexual selection. Only five (out of 113) of the students
confidently knew the difference, despite evolutionary approaches
being one of the topics (briefly) covered in the class. My students
probably get exposed to more evolutionarily oriented psychology
than most (certainly in Australia), but they do not, as is typical,
do a class on evolution, and so they can’t really be expected to
have a proper appreciation of the insights such an understand-
ing provides. An ability to even understand the importance of
an evolutionary perspective in psychology depends, I think, on
genuinely understanding how evolution works, and so we need
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to do what we can to pass on this fundamental knowledge if we
hope to make evolution central in psychology. If our students
(and I know this is also true of almost all of my colleagues)
don’t know the difference between sexual and natural selection,
then they almost certainly don’t know about Hamilton’s rule and
inclusive fitness, Trivers’ Parental Investment Theory, condition-
dependent strategies, honest signaling of mate quality, and a host
of other concepts that are central to understanding the evolution
of behavioral mechanisms in general. Given this, it is not surpris-
ing that they don’t fully appreciate the power and importance of
an evolutionary approach to psychology.
A clear illustration of this problem can be seen in many exist-
ing theories and debates in Psychology, perhaps most tellingly,
even those purporting to be “evolutionary.” For example, Ekman’s
(1992, 1997) well-known theory of universal emotion recogni-
tion and production is taken to be an evolutionary theory because
there is cross-cultural consistency in the way in which the “basic”
expressions are labeled. But the fundamental premise of the
theory—that one’s emotions erupt uncontrollably on the face,
thus communicating them—is at odds with a modern under-
standing of the evolution of communicative signaling, in which
the costs and benefits to the signaler and the receiver need to
be weighed up, and in which a great deal of “communication”
functions to “manipulate” other individuals (Krebs and Dawkins,
1984). A properly informed evolutionary perspective encourages
us to ask how the expressions that we display increase our fitness,
and how detecting and responding to them affects the fitness of
the receivers.
Similarly, a great deal of debate in the face (identity) percep-
tion literature has focused on whether the Fusiform Face Area
(FFA) only “processes” faces, or whether it is actually a part of
the brain “for” perceiving any object that is habitually catego-
rized at the subordinate level and with which we have substantial
experience, and therefore expertise (e.g., Kanwisher et al., 1997;
Gauthier et al., 1999). This debate has been widely construed as
one between those who believe that there is an “evolved” “spe-
cial” face area and those who hold that the apparent specialness
is a consequence of expertise and the unusual nature of the stim-
uli being perceived. If the protagonists in this debate had a better
grounding in the nature of evolved adaptations, they would not
be using evidence that experience makes a difference to how some
objects are “processed” to decide whether FFA is an evolved face
perception area, since such effects are essentially orthogonal to
whether the area originally evolved “to” perceive faces (Barrett,
2012; Burke and Sulikowski, 2013). Indeed, the fact that people
can learn to use FFA to discriminate between “greebles” (artificial
stimuli that differ in configural ways like faces) tells us as much
about the evolved function of FFA as the fact that people can learn
to ride bicycles tells us about the evolved function of legs.
WHAT TO DO?
To some extent EP is a victim of its own success. I think we all
agree that stand-alone degree programs, and specialist confer-
ences and journals are an important part of the field developing
an identity and progressing without having to have protracted
(and pointless) debates with those opposed to our approach,
but they also have a tendency to isolate EP researchers (and
maybe especially the new generation who are coming through
the programs) from the core evolutionary biology and behavioral
ecology that originally formed the inspiration for our discipline,
and also from mainstream psychology. This isolation/protection
has the potential to reduce the “selection pressure” on the field,
and so to enable the proliferation of approaches that fall under
the EP umbrella that are less rigorous than they would otherwise
be. We would be wise to guard against this, to avoid provid-
ing opponents with genuine ammunition. Of course, it is almost
inevitable that every area will produce some poor research, but
given that EP faces motivated opposition in a way that most other
sub-disciplines of psychology don’t, and depends on a core of
knowledge that most of our colleagues don’t have, we need to
be especially careful to ensure that our output is as rigorous and
well-informed as it can possibly be. It might also be helpful to be
conscious of the nature of the opposition our findings may face,
and the ways in which they may be misunderstood, and to pre-
emptively allay them in our published papers, and especially in
our dealings with the media (when this is possible).
In addition to courses on EP itself (ideally with compara-
tive psychology integrated into them), I think it is important
that all psychology students learn basic evolutionary biology and
behavioral ecology (andmaybe physical anthropology where such
classes still exist)—completely independently of psychology. This
comprises much of the core knowledge they need to approach
psychology from an evolutionary perspective, both in terms of
the actual content of such classes, but also in the mere fact
of being exposed to complex adapted mechanisms in a wide
range of species, giving them the appropriate perspective on
human behavioral mechanisms. I suspect that without produc-
ing a generation of psychology students who properly understand
evolution, we will always be fighting a losing battle to have evolu-
tionary approaches integrated into mainstream psychology. Even
if we could, overnight, instill a burning desire in all psycholo-
gists to approach their research from an evolutionary perspective,
this would likely hinder more than help our field because they
would be unable to do research that is properly informed by an
understanding of evolution.
Although I think it is important to publish our findings in
mainstream psychology journals (arduous though this task can
be), I think it might actually be a good idea to stop trying to
explain what EP is to those outside the field. So far that seems
to have served mostly to focus opposition, and as I have argued
here, some of that opposition might be at least partially justified.
As a brief survey of the kinds of papers being published in the field
shows, the summaries that have been produced don’t really reflect
the majority of the research being conducted, anyway. I wonder if
a more effective strategy might be to instead target mainstream
(ideally high impact) outlets for findings that either would never
have been investigated without an evolutionary approach, or of
phenomena that make no sense except in light of evolution. EP
is also a very media-friendly discipline (something that I suspect
makes us more of a target from our mainstream colleagues than
we might otherwise be). Ideally, we would be able to use that
interest in a more strategic way than we currently do, again, by
making more widely known studies in which aspects of human
psychology only make sense in light of well-established, general
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evolutionary principles—the kinds of findings that don’t depend
on any untested assumptions about our recent ancestors, or the
structure and nature of our cognitive mechanisms, but rather are
straightforward, essentially irrefutable corollaries of fundamen-
tal evolutionary principles. A good example of such a finding is
the MHC-dependent odor preferences discovered by Wedekind
et al. (1995). These are the kinds of findings that I believe are
most likely to convince skeptics of the value of our approach, and
which could lay the foundations of a psychology that genuinely
integrates evolution.
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